The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana

Markus Goldstein and Christopher Udry

No 28479, Center Discussion Papers from Yale University, Economic Growth Center

Abstract: We examine the impact of ambiguous and contested land rights on investment and productivity in agricultural in Akwapim, Ghana. We show that individuals who hold powerful positions in a local political hierarchy have more secure tenure rights, and that as a consequence they invest more in land fertility and have substantially higher output. The intensity of investments on different plots cultivated by a given individual correspond to that individual's security of tenure over those specific plots, and in turn to the individual's position in the political hierarchy relevant to those specific plots. We interpret these results in the context of a simple model of the political allocation of land rights in local matrilineages.

Keywords: Land; Economics/Use (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana (2008)
Working Paper: The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:yaleeg:28479

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.28479

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