Earthquake strikes twice: electoral (dis)advantage in municipalities without economic recovery aid

Federico Fantechi (), Ugo Fratesi and Politecnico di Milano Livert ()
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Federico Fantechi: University of Palermo
Politecnico di Milano Livert: Politecnico di Milano

No 2024-16, Discussion Paper series in Regional Science & Economic Geography from Gran Sasso Science Institute, Social Sciences

Abstract: Is there electoral punishment for local politicians considered by their citizens to have performed poorly during emergencies? This is studied in the Italian case, where a law officially listing earthquake-affected municipalities also de-facto prevents those left-out from receiving major aid. Electoral results after the four major earthquakes affecting the country over the past three decades are analysed through a difference-in differences approach. Results indicate that mayors of municipalities severely affected by earthquakes and not getting financial support are electorally punished in the next election. The mechanisms are investigated alongside the influence of the local context.

Keywords: Earthquakes; Electoral Accountability; Voter Turnout; Local Governance; Disaster Recovery; Mayors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 Q54 R10 R51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49 pages
Date: 2024-12, Revised 2025-03
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ahy:wpaper:wp60

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