Network Design under Local Complementarities

Mohamed Belhaj (), Sebastian Bervoets and Frédéric Deroïan ()

No 1309, AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France

Abstract: We consider agents playing a linear network game with strategic complementarities. We analyse the problem of a policy maker who can change the structure of the network in order to increase the aggregate efforts of the individuals and/or the sum of their utilities, given that the number of links of the network has to remain fixed. We identify some link reallocations that guarantee an improvement of aggregate efforts and/or aggregate utilities. With this comparative statics exercise, we then prove that the networks maximising both aggregate outcomes (efforts and utilities) belong to the class of Nested-Split Graphs.

Keywords: Network; Linear Interaction; Bonacich Centralities; Strategic Complementarity; Nested Split Graphs. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2013-02-12, Revised 2013-02-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Network Design under Local Complementarities (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1309

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