Trust and the Welfare State: The Twin Peaks Curve

Yann Algan, Pierre Cahuc and Marc Sangnier

No 1424, AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France

Abstract: We show the existence of a twin peaks relation between trust and the size of the welfare state that stems from two opposing forces. Uncivic people support large welfare states because they expect to benefit from them without bearing their costs. But civic individuals support generous benefits and high taxes only when they are surrounded by trustworthy individuals. We provide empirical evidence for these behaviors and this twin peaks relation in the OECD countries.

Keywords: welfare state; Trust; civism; corruption; redistribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H1 Z1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2014-06, Revised 2014-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ltv and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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http://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/sites/default/files/_dt/2012/wp_2014_-_nr_24.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Trust and the Welfare State: the Twin Peaks Curve (2016)
Working Paper: Trust and the Welfare State: the Twin Peaks Curve (2016)
Working Paper: Trust and the Welfare State: the Twin Peaks Curve (2016)
Working Paper: Trust and the Welfare State: the Twin Peaks Curve (2014)
Working Paper: Trust and the Welfare State: the Twin Peaks Curve (2014)
Working Paper: Trust and the Welfare State: The Twin Peaks Curve (2014)
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Working Paper: Trust and the Welfare State: The Twin Peaks Curve (2014)
Working Paper: Efficient and Inefficient Welfare States (2011)
Working Paper: Efficient and Inefficient Welfare States (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1424

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