Overcoming Coordination Failure in a Critical Mass Game: Strategic Motives and Action Disclosure
No 1609, AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France
We study whether coordination failure is more often overcome if players can easily disclose their actions. In an experiment subjects first choose their action and then choose whether to disclose this action to other group members, and disclosure costs are varied between treatments. We find that no group overcomes coordination failure when action disclosure costs are high, but half of the groups do so when the costs are low. Simulations with a belief learning model can predict which groups will overcome coordination failure, but only if it is assumed that players are either farsighted, risk-seeking or pro-social. To distinguish between these explanations we collected additional data on individual preferences and the degree of farsightedness. We find that in the low cost treatment players classified as more farsighted more often deviate from an inefficient convention and disclose this action, while the effect of risk and social preferences is not significant.
Keywords: lock-in; coordination failure; learning; strategic teaching; information; collective action; critical mass (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 58 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-gth and nep-soc
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Journal Article: Overcoming coordination failure in a critical mass game: Strategic motives and action disclosure (2017)
Working Paper: Overcoming coordination failure in a critical mass game: Strategic motives and action disclosure (2017)
Working Paper: Overcoming Coordination Failure in a Critical Mass Game: Strategic Motives and Action Disclosure (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1609
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