Does Pay Inequality Affect Worker Effort? An Assessment of Existing Laboratory Designs

Marco Fongoni

No 2230, AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France

Abstract: This paper develops a theoretical framework to think about employees' effort choices, and applies this framework to assess the ability of existing laboratory designs to identify the effect of pay inequality on worker effort. The analysis shows that failure to control for a number of confounds-such as reciprocity towards the employer in multilateral gift-exchange games (vertical fairness), or the incentive to increase effort when feeling underpaid under piece rates (income targeting)-may lead to inaccurate interpretation of evidence of treatment effects. In light of these findings, the paper provides a set of recommendations on how to improve identification in the design of laboratory experiments in the future.

Keywords: pay inequality; effort; laboratory experiments; reference dependence; fairness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D91 J31 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2022-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-lma
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Related works:
Journal Article: Does pay inequality affect worker effort? An assessment of experimental designs and evidence (2024)
Working Paper: Does Pay Inequality Affect Worker Effort? An Assessment of Existing Laboratory Designs (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aim:wpaimx:2230

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