Flip-flopping and Endogenous Turnout

Alexandre Arnout ()
Additional contact information
Alexandre Arnout: Aix-Marseille University, CNRS, AMSE, Marseille France, https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/members/arnout

No 2423, AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France

Abstract: I consider an electoral competition model where each candidate is associated with an exogenous initial position from which she can deviate to maximize her vote share, a strategy known as flip-flopping. Citizens have an intrinsic preference for consistent candidates, and abstain due to alienation, i.e. when their utility from their preferred candidate falls below a common exogenous threshold (termed the alienation threshold). I show how the alienation threshold shapes candidates’ flip-flopping strategy. When the alienation threshold is high, i.e. when citizens are reluctant to vote, there is no flip-flopping at equilibrium. When the alienation threshold is low, candidates flip-flop toward the center of the policy space. Surprisingly, I find a positive correlation between flip-flopping and voter turnout at equilibrium, despite voters’ preference for consistent candidates. Finally, I explore alternative models in which candidates’ objective function differs from vote share. I show that electoral competition can lead to polarization when candidates maximize their number of votes.

Keywords: flip-flopping; turnout; electoral competition; alienation; polarization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2024-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-pol and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/sites/default/fil ... /wp_2024_-_nr_23.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aim:wpaimx:2423

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France AMU-AMSE - 5-9 Boulevard Maurice Bourdet, CS 50498 - 13205 Marseille Cedex 1. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Gregory Cornu ().