Do rights to resistance discipline the elites? An experiment on the threat of overthrow
Konstantin Chatziathanasiou (),
Svenja Hippel () and
Michael Kurschilgen ()
Additional contact information
Konstantin Chatziathanasiou: University of MuÌˆnster
Svenja Hippel: Unversity of WuÌˆrzburg
Michael Kurschilgen: Technical University of Munich and the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Munich Papers in Political Economy from TUM School of Governance at the Technical University of Munich
The threat of overthrow stabilizes a constitution because it disciplines the elites. This is the main rationale behind rights to resistance. In this paper, we test this conjecture experimentally. We model a society in which players can produce wealth by solving a coordination problem. Coordination is facilitated through a pre-game status-ranking. Compliance with the status hierarchy yields an efficient yet inequitable payoff distribution, in which a playerâ€™s wealth is determined by her pre-game status. Between treatments, we vary (a) whether overthrows â€“ which reset the status-ranking via collective disobedience â€“ are possible or not, and (b) whether voluntary redistributive transfers â€“ which high-status players can use to appease the low-status players â€“ are available or not. In contrast to established thinking we find that, on average, the threat of overthrow does not have a stabilizing effect as high-status players fail to provide sufficient redistribution to prevent overthrows. However, if an overthrow brings generous players into high-status positions, groups stabilize and prosper. This suggests an alternative rationale for rights to resistance.
Keywords: Rights to resistance; civil resistance; constitutional stability; redistribution; coordination; battle of the sexes; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D74 H23 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aiw:wpaper:08
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Munich Papers in Political Economy from TUM School of Governance at the Technical University of Munich Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Luca Messerschmidt ().