What Theory and the Empirical Evidence Tell Us about Proxy Access

Bernard Sharfman
Additional contact information
Bernard Sharfman: Mercury Publication

No 6897, Working Papers from George Mason University, Mercatus Center

Abstract: Traditionally, the default rules of corporate and securities law have provided a public company’s board of directors with exclusive authority to decide whether shareholder proposals on proxy access are to be included in that company’s proxy solicitation m

Pages: Length not available.
Date: 2016-08-30
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published

Downloads: (external link)
https://mercury.mercatus.org/Product/ViewFinalCopy/266 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 503 Service Temporarily Unavailable

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ajw:wpaper:06897

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from George Mason University, Mercatus Center Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jim Ronyak ().