The FCC and Quasi-Common Carriage: A Case Study of Agency Survival

Brent Skorup and Joe Kane
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Joe Kane: Mercury Publication

No 6921, Working Papers from George Mason University, Mercatus Center

Abstract: In this article, we identify why, despite competition, falling prices, and expanding output in telecommunications and media, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) will survive indefinitely and may expand its jurisdiction. A prominent theory after th

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Date: 2016-09-20
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ajw:wpaper:06921

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