A Strong No Show Paradox is a common flaw in Condorcet Voting Correspondences

Joaquín Pérez

No 1/00, Doctorado en Economía- documentos de trabajo from Programa de doctorado en Economía. Universidad de Alcalá.

Abstract: The No Show Paradox (there is a voter who would rather not vote) is known to affect every Condorcet voting function. This paper analyses a strong version of this paradox (there is a voter whose favorite candidate loses the election if she votes honestly, but gets elected if she abstains) in the context of Condorcet voting correspondences. All Condorcet correspondences satisfying some weak domination properties are shown to be affected by this strong form of the paradox. On the other hand, with the exception of the Simpson-Cramer Minmax, all the Condorcet correspondences that (to the best of our knowledge) are proposed in the literature suffer this paradox.

JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages 22
Date: 1998, Revised 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www2.uah.es/docecon/documentos/DT1.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to www2.uah.es:80 (No such host is known. )

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:alc:alcddt:1/00

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Doctorado en Economía- documentos de trabajo from Programa de doctorado en Economía. Universidad de Alcalá. Alcalá de Henares 28803. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Juan Muro ().