Controlling collusion in auctions: The Role of ceilings and reserve prices

Prabal Roy Chowdhury ()
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Prabal Roy Chowdhury: Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi

Discussion Papers from Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi

Abstract: We examine a simple model of collusion under a single-object secondprice auction. Under the appropriate parameter conditions, in particular as long as collusion is neither too easy, nor too difficult, we find that the optimal policy involves both an effective ceiling, as well as a reserve price set at the lowest bidder valuation.

Keywords: Auctions; ceilings; collusion; reserve prices (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2007-04
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