Characterization of the walrasian equilibria of the assignment model

Debasis Mishra and Adolphus Talman

Discussion Papers from Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi

Abstract: We study the assignment model where a collection of indivisible goods are sold to a set of buyers who want to buy at most one good. We characterize the extreme and interior points of the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors for this model. Our characterizations are in terms of demand sets of buyers. Using these characterizations, we also give a unique characterization of the minimum and the maximum Walrasian equilibrium price vectors. Also, necessary and suncient conditions are given under which the interior of the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors is non-empty. Several of the results are derived by interpreting Walrasian equilibrium price vectors as potential functions of an appropriate directed graph.

JEL-codes: C69 D44 D50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2008-10
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Related works:
Journal Article: Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model (2010)
Working Paper: Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:alo:isipdp:08-07

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