Roberts' theorem with neutrality: A Social welfare ordering approach

Debasis Mishra and Arunava Sen ()
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Arunava Sen: Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi

Discussion Papers from Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi

Abstract: We consider dominant strategy implementation in private values settings, when agents have multi-dimensional types, the set of alternatives is finite, monetary transfers are allowed, and agents have quasi-linear utilities. We show that any implementable and neutral social choice function must be a weighted welfare maximizer if the type space of every agent is an m-dimensional open interval, where m is the number of alternatives. When the type space of every agent is unrestricted, Roberts' theorem with neutrality (Roberts, 1979) becomes a corollary to our result. Our proof technique uses a social welfare ordering approach, commonly used in aggregation literature in social choice theory. We also prove the general (affine maximizer) version of Roberts' theorem for unrestricted type spaces of agents using this approach.

Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2010-03
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Related works:
Journal Article: Robertsʼ Theorem with neutrality: A social welfare ordering approach (2012)
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