Strategy-proof partitioning

Debasis Mishra and Souvik Roy
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Souvik Roy: University of Caen

Discussion Papers from Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi

Abstract: We consider the problem of choosing a partition of a set of objects by a set of agents. The private information of each agent is a strict ordering over the set of partitions of the objects. A social choice function chooses a partition given the reported preferences of the agents. We impose a natural restriction on the allowable set of strict orderings over the set of partitions, which we call an intermediate domain. Our main result is a complete characterization of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions in the intermediate domain. We also show that a social choice function is strategy-proof and unanimous if and only if it is a meet social choice function.

Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2011-06
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Journal Article: Strategy-proof partitioning (2012)
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