Deterministic single object auctions with private values

Debasis Mishra and Abdul Quadir
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Abdul Quadir: Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi

Discussion Papers from Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi

Abstract: We study deterministic single object auctions in private values environments. We show that a deterministic allocation rule is implementable (in dominant strategies) if and only if it is a generalized utility maximizer. With a mild continuity condition, we show that a deterministic allocation rule is implementable and non-bossy if and only if it is a virtual utility maximizer (with appropriate tie-breaking). Both our results extend the seminal result of Roberts (1979) from unrestricted domain to the restricted domain of single object auctions.

Keywords: single object auction; implementation in dominant strategies; rationalizability; non-bossiness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2012-09
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