Affine maximizers in domains with selfish valuations

Swaprava Nath and Nath and Arunava Sen
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Swaprava Nath: Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi
Nath and Arunava Sen: Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi

Discussion Papers from Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi

Abstract: We consider the domain of selfish and Lipschitz continuous preferences over a "rich" allocation space and show that onto, strategyproof and allocation non-bossy social choice functions are affine maximizers. Roberts (1979) proves this result for a finite set of alternatives and an unrestricted valuation space. In this paper, we show that in a sub-domain of the unrestricted valuations with the additional assumption of allocation non-bossiness, using the richness of the allocations, the strategyproof social choice functions can be shown to be affine maximizers. We provide an example to show that allocation non-bossiness is indeed critical for this result. This work shows that an affine maximizer result needs certain amount of richness split across valuations and allocations.

Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2014-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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