Conflict and development
Dushyant Kumar () and
Prabal Roy Chowdhury ()
Additional contact information
Dushyant Kumar: Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi
Prabal Roy Chowdhury: Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi
Discussion Papers from Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi
Abstract:
We examine a dynamic two-stage incumbent-challenger model of internal conflict, where the government, i.e. the incumbent, is in power, while the rebel challenges the government in a bid to capture state power. The central issue is the trade-off between development and security-based measures in countering such rebellion activity. We find that while an exogenous increase in development decreases the level of rebellion activity, it increases the level of security based measures by the government. Further, if the rebel is `dominant' to begin with, then, with the rebel becoming stronger, the level of rebel activity increases, while the security based measures by the government is lowered. Finally, if the rebel becomes stronger (i.e. becomes more cost efficient), then the government might find it optimal to decrease the level of development. Thus our analysis suggests that the trade-off is a nuanced one.
Keywords: Conflicts; development; rebel; contest success functions; difference-form (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 D78 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2015-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.isid.ac.in/~epu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/dp15-05.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:alo:isipdp:15-05
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Discussion Papers from Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Debasis Mishra ().