Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains

Debasis Mishra

Discussion Papers from Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi

Abstract: We study deterministic voting mechanisms by considering an ordinal notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility (OBIC). If the beliefs of agents are independent and generic, we show that a mechanism is OBIC and satisfies an additional condition called elementary monotonicity if and only if it is a dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism. Our result works in a large class of preference domains (that include the unrestricted domain, the single-peaked domain, the single-dipped domain, and some single-crossing domains). We can significantly weaken elementary monotonicity in our result in the single-peaked domain if we assume unanimity and in a large class of domains if we assume unanimity and tops-onlyness.

Keywords: Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility; single-peaked domain; elementary monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2016-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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