Political Economy of Land Acquisition and Holdout

Sreeparna Saha (), Prabal Roy Chowdhury (), Jaideep Roy and Prasad Bhattarcharya ()
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Sreeparna Saha: Deakin University
Prabal Roy Chowdhury: Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi
Prasad Bhattarcharya: Deakin University

Discussion Papers from Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi

Abstract: Imperfections like bureaucratic corruption and extra-legal influence of various stakeholders – including political parties and civil society organisations – can reinforce one another and distort property rights. We characterise conditions under which holdout in land acquisition arises precisely because of the interplay between these imperfections. Among other results, we develop testable hypotheses suggesting that reducing bureaucratic corruption may in fact increase holdout if these imperfections are significant. In addition, small improvements in institutions can hurt economic surplus. Moreover, sellers are worse off when institutions fail to control excessive opposition, although the fact that there is an opposition to land acquisition benefits the sellers.

Keywords: Land acquisition; bureaucratic corruption; political rent-seeking; opposition; holdout (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K11 O25 Q15 R52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 53 pages
Date: 2016-08
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