Optimal Intergenerational Transfers: Public Education and Pensions

Monisankar Bishnu (), Shresth Garg (), Tishara Garg () and Tridip Ray
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Monisankar Bishnu: Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi
Shresth Garg: Harvard University
Tishara Garg: Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi

Discussion Papers from Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi

Abstract: In presence of imperfections in education loan market, the standard policy response of intervening solely on education front, funded through taxes and transfers, necessarily hurts the initial working population. The literature suggests compensating them via pay-as-you-go pensions as a possible solution. But for various reasons sustainability of PAYG pensions is under serious doubt. We carry out the optimal policy exercise of a utilitarian government in a dynamically ecient economy with pension and education support obeying the Pareto criterion. We find that expansion of one instrument along with the other emerges as the optimal response, however, once the complete market level of education is achieved, the optimal policy suggests phasing pensions out. Eventually, government leads the economy to an equilibrium with zero pension and the Golden Rule level of education. This is achieved by exploiting only market opportunities without relying on other factors including human capital externalities highlighted in the literature

Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2018-08
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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal intergenerational transfers: Public education and pensions (2021)
Working Paper: Optimal intergenerational transfers: Public education and pensions (2020)
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