Institutional Imperfections and Buyer-Induced Holdout in Land Acquisition

Sreeparna Saha (), Prabal Roy Chowdhury, Jaideep Roy and Grazyna Wiejak-Roy ()
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Sreeparna Saha: Central Queensland University
Prabal Roy Chowdhury: Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi
Grazyna Wiejak-Roy: University of the West of England

Discussion Papers from Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi

Abstract: Imperfect institutions, particularly in developing economies, encourage bureaucratic corruption and outside interference by political parties or civic-society organisations, thereby distorting property rights for land. We characterise conditions when an industrial buyer’s optimal design to acquire land strategically involves holdout as a response to these imperfections. We propose testable hypotheses suggesting that such form of holdout increases (i) with a reduction in corruption if the current imperfections are significant, (ii) with an increase in ease of political opposition, and (iii) during elections. We also study welfare implications and discuss the relevance of the framework and the results for advanced economies.

Keywords: Land acquisition; institutional imperfections; outside interference; buyer-induced holdout.Sector; Public Sector (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K11 O25 Q15 R52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2020-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-law
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Journal Article: Institutional Imperfections and Buyer-Induced Holdout in Land Acquisition (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:alo:isipdp:20-02

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