Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains

Sarvesh Bandhu (), Bishwajyoti Mondal () and Anup Pramanik ()
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Sarvesh Bandhu: IIM, Bangalore
Bishwajyoti Mondal: Department Of Economics, Shiv Nadar University

No 2021-02, Working Papers from Shiv Nadar University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we provide a complete characterization of preference domains on which the Unanimity with Status-quo rule is strategy-proof. Further, we introduce a notion of "conflicting preference domains" and show that the Unanimity with Status- quo rule defined over these domains is strategy-proof.

Keywords: Voting; Strategy-proofness; Unanimity with status-quo rules; Conflicting preference domains. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2021-11-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains (2022)
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