Using Private Contracts to Create Adoptions from Foster Care

Mary Hansen ()
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Mary Hansen: Department of Economics, American University

No 2007-03, Working Papers from American University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Creating adoptions for children waiting in foster care is a good investment, but the number of adoptions created each year meets only a fraction of the need. This paper explores how the organization of the delivery of social services to waiting children and prospective adoptive families influences adoption creation. Cross-section time-series estimates are supplemented with a new augmented fixed effects procedure to demonstrate that the use of contracts with private agencies bolsters adoption creation. Contracts for recruitment and orientation of prospective adoptive parents are particularly effective.

Keywords: adoption; child welfare; fixed effects vector decomposition; foster care; privatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 J13 J18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2007-04
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https://doi.org/10.17606/vxae-nj14 First version, 2007 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:amu:wpaper:0307

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