From Agreement to Application. A Cross Country Analysis of Injury Determinants under the WTO Antidumping Agreement

Kara Reynolds

No 2006-12, Working Papers from American University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Although the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Antidumping Agreement includes rules that govern the application of antidumping duties, countries still have a great deal of latitude in how they decide whether to impose this form of protection. This research is one of the first papers to explore country and industry specific differences in the determinants of antidumping injury decisions. Using a randomcoefficients probit model, I estimate the amount of variance in the marginal impact of particular characteristics on the probability of an affirmative injury determination. I investigate to what extent this variance can be explained by specific characteristics of the investigating country. The results indicate that there is a great deal of inconsistency in injury decisions under the current WTO Antidumping Agreement.

Keywords: Antidumping; World Trade Organization; Random- Coefficients (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2006-09
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https://doi.org/10.17606/4h97-qg16 First version, 2006 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:amu:wpaper:1206

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