Maintaining New Markets: Determinants of Antitrust Enforcement in Central and Eastern Europe

Robert Feinberg, Mieke Meurs and Kara Reynolds

No 2010-05, Working Papers from American University, Department of Economics

Abstract: While others have examined the implementation and/or the stringency of enforcement of antitrust laws in post-socialist economies, this paper is the first study that attempts to explain the determinants of antitrust enforcement activity across post-socialist countries using economic and political variables. Using a panel of ten European post-socialist countries over periods ranging from 4 to 11 years, we find a number of significant determinants of enforcement in these countries. For example, larger economies engage in more antitrust enforcement, and countries have tended to increase their enforcement efforts over time. Our results also suggest that countries characterized by more unionization and less corruption tend to engage in greater antitrust enforcement of all types. Countries more successful in privatizing have filed fewer cases, while more affluent or developed countries investigate fewer cases of all types, consistent with an income-shifting motivation for antitrust.

Keywords: Antitrust Enforcement; Central and Eastern Europe; Competition Policy JEL classification: L4; P3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-eur, nep-reg and nep-tra
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https://doi.org/10.17606/t99p-zd13 First version, 2010 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:amu:wpaper:2010-05

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