The Dynamic Voting Patterns of the Bank of England's MPC

Jan Berk, Beata Bierut and Ellen Meade

No 2010-17, Working Papers from American University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The literature on the behavior of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has focused on static voting patterns. We find statistical support for a dynamic pattern using a panel reaction function to analyze MPC votes over the 1997-2008 period. We find that internal and external members do not behave differently in their first year on the MPC. In their third year of tenure, internal members prefer higher policy rates, placing a higher weight on price stability and a lower weight on the output gap than external members.

JEL-codes: D71 D72 E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.17606/9b6k-m906 First version, 2010-05 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:amu:wpaper:2010-17

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from American University, Department of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Meal ().