Effort-Based Career Opportunities and Working Time
Massimiliano Bratti and
Stefano Staffolani ()
No 203, Working Papers from Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali
The authors evaluate the economic effects of the hypothesis of effort-based career opportunities, described as a situation in which a firm creates incentives for employees to work longer hours than bargained (or desired), by making career prospects depend on relative working hours. Firms' personnel management policies may tend to increase working time (or workers' effort) in order to maximize profits. Effort-based career opportunities raise working time, production and output per worker, and reduce workers' utility. The authors make a first attempt to empirically estimate the relationship between hours worked and the expected opportunities of promotion using the British Household Panel Survey data set. Their analysis shows that the perceived probability of promotion increases with working time, and that this result is robust to various econometric specifications.
Keywords: bargaining; career; personnel management; promotion; welfare; working time (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J22 J23 J50 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
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Journal Article: Effort-based career opportunities and working time (2007)
Working Paper: Effort-Based Career Opportunities and Working Time (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:anc:wpaper:203
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