Love for Variety and Non Market Allocation Mechanisms in Public Provision of Goods

Fabio Fiorillo ()

No 317, Working Papers from Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali

Abstract: In this note we modify a Dixit-Stiglitz's classical framework to consider the love for variety argument in public provision of goods and services. Since in the supply of public goods and services the allocation cannot be driven by market, we analyse which is the optimal allocation mechanism.

Keywords: Dixit-Stiglitz's framework; non market allocation; public provision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12
Date: 2008-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:anc:wpaper:317

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