DOES POLITICAL AFFILIATION MATTER ON POST-PARLIAMENTARY CAREERS IN THE BOARDS OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES?
Fabio Fiorillo () and
Raffaella Santolini ()
No 429, Working Papers from Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali
Research on post-parliamentary careers has so far neglected the effect of political affiliation on the appointment of ex-members of Parliament to public firms boards of director. This article intends to fill this gap by conducting an empirical analysis on a sample of 1,419 deputies of Italian Parliament elected over the period 1994-2001. The regression discontinuity estimates show that the probability of being appointed to the board of public enterprises of center-left ex-deputies is about 15 percentage points higher than that of center-right ex-deputies. This result brings to light the politicization of Italian public firms, put in place through the appointment of ex-deputies in managerial positions.
Keywords: party affiliation; political appointment; public enterprises; regression discontinuity design; Italy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 H82 J45 L32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:anc:wpaper:429
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