FIRING COSTS AND JOB LOSS: THE CASE OF THE ITALIAN JOBS ACT

Claudia Pigini and Stefano Staffolani

No 443, Working Papers from Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali

Abstract: A recent reform in the Italian labour market has modified the permanent contract by reducing firing costs. Using a discontinuity in the application of the reform, we evaluate its the effect on the probability of being still employed 600 days later. In contrast with theoretical predictions, we find that the job survival probability is not smaller for the treated and even significantly larger in some cases. We investigate the composition of permanent workers hired after the reform, as we find evidence of treated firms hiring workers eligible for a significant reduction of non-wage labour costs.

Keywords: Keywords: Deregulation; Employment Protection Legislation; Graded Security; Open-Ended Contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J23 J30 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46
Date: 2019-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-lma and nep-ore
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http://docs.dises.univpm.it/web/quaderni/pdf/443.pdf First version, 2019 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Firing Costs and Job Loss: The Case of the Italian Jobs Act (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:anc:wpaper:443

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