Fisical and Monetary Policy Coordination with Endogenous Unions: a Theoretical Policy Game

Rita Cappariello ()

No 93, Working Papers from Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyse the effects in terms of output, price and budget level, of monetary and fiscal policies aimed at stabilising the level of output and, thus, employment. This issue is discussed by using a one-shot game which investigates on the macroeconomic consequences of the interaction among three independent endogenous utility-maximising agents: the central bank, the government and the trade union. The model allows also to evaluate the impact on the economy of institutional reforms modifying the degree of central bank's independence and the degree of centralisation in the wage bargaining process. This theoretical framework offers a key to interpret the performance of the Italian economy in the light of some important institutional reforms introduced since the mid-eighties.

Pages: 27
Date: 1997-06
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http://docs.dises.univpm.it/web/quaderni/pdf/093.pdf First version, 1997 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:anc:wpaper:93

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