FEDERALISMO FISCAL E CRESCIMENTO DO GOVERNO: EVIDÊNCIAS ELEITORAIS PARA O BRASIL

Marcos Mendes

Anais do XXXII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 32nd Brazilian Economics Meeting] from ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics]

Abstract: Political economy literature considers fiscal federalism as a mechanism to refrain the growth of government. However, an unbalanced federalism may induce government growth. This paper studies the Brazilian case, in which the municipalities are beneficiaries of a common pool of federal and state fiscal resources. It is shown that an increase in municipal expenditure and the creation of new municipalities, funded by the common pool, are winner electoral strategies for mayors that seek reelection, which induces the growth of government through the years. It is used a probit selection econometric model.

JEL-codes: C25 H72 H77 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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