Inflation and unemployment in OECD countries: The role of political ideologies, central bank independance and industrial relations
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo () and
Bruno Merlevede ()
Working Papers from University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics
This paper considers the effects of central bank independence, labor market institutions and the political partisanship on economic performance. In particular, we test if the partisanship of the government and the degree of central bank independence affect the relationship between labor market institutions and economic performance. We find evidence of interaction effects between the government’s partisanship and the labor market institutions. An increase in union density favors a left-wing government, while an increase in coordination favors a right-wing government. We also find that changes in the partisanship of the government have a larger impact on inflation and unemployment when the labor market is more institutionalized.
Keywords: Partisanship; Labor market institutions; Central bank independence; Economic performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E00 E58 E61 J50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-lab, nep-mac, nep-mon and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ant:wpaper:2003001
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