When rivals team up in procurement: does it distort competition?

Jan Bouckaert and Geert van Moer

Working Papers from University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics

Abstract: The purpose of this article is to offer insights to courts and competition authorities on how to assess horizontal agreements to team up in a procured project. We argue that agreements which are specified in advance of bidding should be evaluated against the counterfactual whereby firms negotiate subcontracts after bidding has ended. Following this approach, we challenge the commonly held viewpoint that joint bidding distorts competition if the bidding consortium members could each bid solo. We also question the need for bidding consortium members to integrate their operations.

Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2022-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ant:wpaper:2022001

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