The Dark Side of Transparency: Mission Variety and Industry Equilibrium in Decentralized Public Good Provision

Gani Aldashev, Esteban Jaimovich and Thierry Verdier

No 125, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)

Abstract: We study the implications of transparency policies on decentralized public good provision. The moral hazard inside non-profits interacts with the competitive structure of the sector under alternative informational regimes. More transparency on the use of funds has an ambiguous e§ect on the total public good provision and donors’ welfare. Transparency encourages non-profits to more actively curb rent-seeking inside organizations, but it also tilts the playing field against non-profits facing higher monitoring costs, inducing them to abandon their missions and reducing non-profit diversity. Donors’ welfare is lower under transparency for intermediate levels of asymmetry in monitoring costs.

Keywords: public goods; non-profit organizations; charitable giving; altruism; transparency. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D43 D64 L31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51 pages
Date: 2022-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Downloads: (external link)
https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/125.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Dark Side of Transparency: Mission Variety and Industry Equilibrium in Decentralised Public Good Provision (2023)
Working Paper: The dark side of transparency: mission variety and industry equilibrium in decentralised public good provision (2023)
Working Paper: The dark side of transparency: mission variety and industry equilibrium in decentralised public good provision (2023)
Working Paper: The Dark Side of Transparency: Mission Variety and Industry Equilibrium in Decentralized Public Good Provision (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aoz:wpaper:125

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