Core and Stability Notions in Many-to-one Matching Markets with Indifferences
Agustín Bonifacio (),
Pablo Neme () and
Jorge Oviedo ()
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Noelia Juarez: Universidad Nacional de San Luis/CONICET
No 138, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)
In a many-to-one matching model with responsive preferences in which indifferences are allowed, we study three notions of core, three notions of stability, and their relationships. We show that (i) the core contains the stable set, (ii) the strong core coincides with the strongly stable set, and (iii) the super core coincides with the super stable set. We also show how the core and the strong core in markets with indifferences relate to the stable matchings of their associated tie-breaking strict markets.
Keywords: Matching with indifferences; Stability; Strong Stability; Super Stability; Core; Strong Core; Super Core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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Working Paper: Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aoz:wpaper:138
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