On Wars, Sanctions and Sovereign Default
Javier Bianchi and
Cesar Sosa-Padilla
No 151, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)
Abstract:
This paper explores the role of restrictions on the use of international reserves as economic sanctions. We develop a simple model of the strategic game between a sanctioning (creditor) country and a sanctioned (debtor) country. We show how the sanctioning country should impose restrictions optimally, internalizing the geopolitical benefits and the financial costs of a potential default from the sanctioned country.
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2022-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem, nep-ifn and nep-opm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
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https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/151.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: On wars, sanctions, and sovereign default (2024) 
Working Paper: On Wars, Sanctions and Sovereign Default (2022) 
Working Paper: On Wars, Sanctions and Sovereign Default (2022) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aoz:wpaper:151
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