Marriage market with indifferences: A linear programming approach

Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme and Jorge Oviedo

No 17, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)

Abstract: We study stable ans strongly stable matchings in the marriage market with indifference in their preferences. We characterize the stable matchings as integer extreme points of a convex polytope. We give an alternative proof for the integrity of the strongly stable matching polytope. Also, we compute men-optimal (women-optimal)stable and strongly stable matchings using linear programming. When preferences are strict we find the men- optimal (women-optimal) stable matching.

Keywords: Matching; markets; The; marriage; market; with; indifferences; Optimal; Stable; matchings; Linear; programming (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2020-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1yRjhhr0eI9X7Lb0uBl6G7GATysuSA157/view (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aoz:wpaper:17

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Laura Inés D Amato ().