False-name-proof and Strategy-proof Voting Rules under Separable Preferences

Federico Fioravanti and Jordi Masso
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Federico Fioravanti: Universidad Nacional del Sur/CONICET

No 181, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)

Abstract: We consider the problem of a society that uses a voting rule to select a subset from a given set of objects (candidates, binary issues or alike). We assume that voters’preferences over subsets of objects are separable: Adding an object to a set leads to a better set if and only if the object is good (as a singleton set, the object is better thanthe empty set). A voting rule is strategy-proof if no voter benefits by not revealing its preferences truthfully and it is false-name-proof if no voter gains by submitting severalvotes under other identities. We characterize all voting rules that verify false-nameproofness, strategy-proofness, unanimity, anonymity, and neutrality as either the classof voting by quota one (all voters can be decisive for all objects) or the class of voting by full quota (all voters can veto all objects).

Keywords: False-name-proofness; Strategy-proofness; Separable Preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2022-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/181.pdf (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: False-name-proof and strategy-proof voting rules under separable preferences (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aoz:wpaper:181

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