Non-convergence to stability in coalition formation games

Agustín Bonifacio, Elena Inarra and Pablo Neme

No 23, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)

Abstract: We study the problem of convergence to stability in coalition formation games in which the strategies of each agent are coalitions in which she/he can partici- pate and outcomes are coalition structures. Given a natural blocking dynamic, an absorbing set is a minimum set of coalition structures that once reached is never abandoned. The coexistence of single and non-single absorbing sets is what causes lack of convergence to stability. To characterize games in which both types of set are present, we first relate circularity among coalitions in preferences (rings) with circularity among coalition structures (cycles) and show that there is a ring in pref- erences if and only if there is a cycle in coalition structures. Then we identify a special configuration of overlapping rings in preferences characterizing games that lack convergence to stability. Finally, we apply our findings to the study of games induced by sharing rules.

Keywords: Coalition; formation; Matching; markets; Absorbing; sets; Convergence; to; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2020-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-gth
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1nCyzgrwkqpsYhU6bFq2FhE6MeuhqFAaE/view (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aoz:wpaper:23

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Laura Inés D Amato ().