Obvious Manipulations in Matching with and without Contracts

Pablo R. Arribillaga and Eliana Pepa Risma
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Pablo R. Arribillaga: UNSL/CONICET

No 257, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)

Abstract: In a many-to-one matching model, with or without contracts, where doctors’ preferences are private information and hospitals’ preferences are substitutable and public information, any stable matching rule could be manipulated for doctors. Since manipulations can not be completely avoided, we consider the concept of obvious manipulations and look for stable matching rules that prevent at least such manipulations (for doctors). For the model with contracts, we prove that: (i) the doctor-optimal matching rule is non-obviously manipulable and (ii) the hospital-optimal matching rule is obviously manipulable, even in the one-to-one model. In contrast to (ii), for a many-to-one model without contracts, we prove that the hospital-optimal matching rule is not obviously manipulable.Furthermore, if we focus on quantile stable rules, then we prove that the doctor-optimal matching rule is the only non-obviously manipulable quantile stable rule

Keywords: obvious manipulations; matching; contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2023-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-des and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aoz:wpaper:257

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