Business Cycles and Police Hires

Fernando Saltiel and Cody Tuttle
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Fernando Saltiel: McGill University
Cody Tuttle: University of Texas

No 288, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)

Abstract: We show that the quality of police hires varies over the business cycle. Officers hired when the unemployment rate is high have fewer complaints, disciplines, and are less likely to be fired than officers hired when the unemployment rate is low. Effects are larger for younger workers who have weaker outside options in recessions. We find that the size and quality of the applicant pool increases in high unemployment years–morepeople take entry exams and a larger fraction pass the exam. Our findings shed light on how outside options affect police hires and speak to policy questions about police recruitment.

Keywords: Police hiring; police quality; public sector labor markets; outside options (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J24 J33 J45 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 72 pages
Date: 2023-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-lma
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aoz:wpaper:288

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