Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition

Pablo R. Arribillaga, Jordi Masso and Alejandro Neme
Additional contact information
Pablo R. Arribillaga: Universidad Nacional de San Luis/CONICET
Alejandro Neme: Universidad Nacional de San Luis/CONICET

No 293, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)

Abstract: We define and study obvious strategy-proofness with respect to a partition of the set of agents. It has as special cases strategy-proofness, when the partition is the coarsest one, and obvious strategy-proofness, when the partition is the finest one. For any partition, it lies between these two extreme implementation notions. We give two general properties of the new implementation notion and apply it to the simple voting problem with two alternatives and strict references. We also propose the notion of strong obvious strategy-proofness and show that it coincides with obvious strategy-proofness

Keywords: Obvious strategy-proofness; Extended majority voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2023-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/293.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aoz:wpaper:293

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Laura Inés D Amato (laura.damato@gmail.com).