Corrupt Voting: Information and Electoral Accountability

David Levine, Federico Weinschelbaum and Felipe Zurita
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David Levine: Royal Holloway University of London
Felipe Zurita: Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

No 362, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)

Abstract: Does the ability of the electorate to replace corrupt politicians deter corruption? This paper analyzes the limitations of electoral accountability. Weshow that if the electorate cannot commit elections offer no defense against corruption. However, when a commitment technology exists, the electoratecan strategically choose to remove only those caught taking bribes. This incentivizes corrupt politicians to pass up bribe opportunities for which the valueis small. We then examine how improved monitoring can impact outcomes and show that increasing information quality does not always benefit the electorate.

Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2025-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-pol
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https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/362.pdf (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Corrupt Voting: Information and Electoral Accountability (2025)
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