Strategic Interactions and Gender Cues: Evidence from Social Preference Games

Hernán Bejarano, Matías Busso and Juan Francisco Santos
Additional contact information
Hernán Bejarano: CIDE/Chapman University
Matías Busso: IDB
Juan Francisco Santos: IDB

No 375, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)

Abstract: This paper studies trust, reciprocity, and bargaining using a large-scale online experiment in six Latin American countries. Participants were randomly assigned to play trust and ultimatum games under conditions that either disclosed or withheld the gender of their counterpart. On average, gender disclosure did not affect behavior. However, disaggregated results show systematic differences. Men displayed higher levels of trust and reciprocity, particularly when interacting with women, and offered larger shares to women in bargaining. Women, by contrast, reciprocated more when paired with men. These findings show how gendered interactions can influence economic behavior, even when counterpart information is conveyed minimally.

Keywords: Trust; Reciprocity; Bargaining; Gender; Latin America (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D91 J16 O54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2025-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gen, nep-gth, nep-lab, nep-lam and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/375.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aoz:wpaper:375

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Laura Inés D Amato ().