Time on Camera: An Alternative Explanation of NASCAR Tournaments

Peter Groothuis, Jana Groothuis and Kurt W. Rotthoff

No 09-15, Working Papers from Department of Economics, Appalachian State University

Abstract: NASCAR’s reward structure for rank order tournaments has been considered the exception to the rule in tournament theory due to the linear payout structure. We suggest that the rewards for drivers are nonlinear when you take into consideration the value of sponsorship time on camera and sponsor mentions during a race on TV. Given the importance of corporate sponsorship in NASCAR, we suggest that performance in a race provides additional benefits that are not captured in traditional tournament payments. Key Words:

Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
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