Voluntary Contributions to Property Rights

David Bruner and John R. Boyce

No 13-14, Working Papers from Department of Economics, Appalachian State University

Abstract: This paper reports the results of an experimental test of the Nash equilibrium prediction of voluntary provision of property rights in a contest under anarchy. Speci cally, the experiment investigates whether pre-commitment induces positive provision of property rights. As pre- dicted, zero contributions to property rights are observed without pre- commitment. Positive voluntary contributions are observed with pre- commitment, but are less than predicted. Nonetheless, as predicted, stronger property rights with pre-commitment results in less con ict and more production. The experiment also tests predictions for group- size e ects. While average contributions to property rights are un- a ected by group-size, mean con ict increases and mean production decreases with larger groups. Key Words: Property Rights; Con ict; Public Goods; Experiments

JEL-codes: C72 C91 F35 O12 O43 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-nps and nep-spo
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:apl:wpaper:13-14

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