Compensation Discrimination for Defensive Players: Applying Quantile Regression to the National Football League Market for Defensive Linemen, Linebackers and Defensive Backs

Johnny Ducking, Peter Groothuis and James Richard Hill

No 14-01, Working Papers from Department of Economics, Appalachian State University

Abstract: Two recent articles in the Journal of Sports Economics have analyzed compensation discrimination in the National Football League. Keefer (2013) found white linebackers were paid a premium while Burnett and Van Scyoc (2013) find no white premium for either rookie linebackers or rookie offensive linemen. Following the same techniques we examine the market for all defensive players and three subsets of players: defensive linemen, linebackers, and defensive backs. Our results suggest that labor market discrimination in the NFL is neither systematic nor robust across groups of defensive players. Key Words: National Football League, discrimination, compensation, quantile regression. economics

Date: 2014
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