Rational Skeptics: On the Strategic Communication of Scientific Data

Youngseok Park

No 16-19, Working Papers from Department of Economics, Appalachian State University

Abstract: I show that a credibility gap is created between the scientist and the government if the preference of the scientist is not perfectly aligned with that of the government. I find a remarkable result that the credibility gap is eliminated and the ex-ante social welfare is maximized if and only if the scientist’s preference is perfectly aligned with that of the government, not with that of the median voter. This is endogenously achieved when the government is allowed to appoint its optimal scientist without election concerns. In the case where the government has election concerns, if the median voter perceives an alarming message from the climate scientist, then even a “right-wing” government must choose an aggressive climate change policy to avoid losing the election. Accordingly, it will prefer to appoint a climate scientist who is unlikely to send an alarming message. Thus the government deliberately creates a credibility gap which may cause a distorted climate change policy in a democracy. Key Words: Climate Change; Cheap-Talk; Elections; SocialWelfare.

JEL-codes: D72 D83 H89 Q48 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-ene, nep-env, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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